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FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT
CONSTITUTION
James E. Fleming*

INTRODUCTION

W

HAT is the question of fidelity a question about? The topic of
our Symposium, "Fidelity in Constitutional Theory," raises two

fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity? The

short answer to the first-fidelity to the Constitution-poses a further
question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact relatively concrete historical rules? And does the Constitution
presuppose a political theory of majoritarian democracy or one of
constitutional democracy? The short answer to the second-being
faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it-leads to another question: How should the Constitution be interpreted?' Does faithfulness
to the Fourteenth Amendment require recourse to political theory to
elaborate general moral concepts or prohibit it and instead require
historical research to discover relatively specific original understanding? And does the quest for fidelity in interpreting the Constitution
exhort us to make it the best it can be or forbid us to do so in favor of
enforcing an imperfect Constitution?2
Thus, the central question for the Symposium, "What is the best
conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation?," ultimately
poses the questions, "What is the Constitution and how should it be
interpreted?" The question of fidelity is not a narrower question
about how to follow the original meaning of the text or how to interpret the Constitution so as to fit the historical materials surrounding
its framing and ratification. Those narrower questions grow out of
particular originalist answers to the question of fidelity. They are not
the question of fidelity itself.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. Ph.D. 1988, Princeton University; J.D. 1985, Harvard University; A.B. 1977, University of Missouri.
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1. These questions of What and How, along with the question of Who is to interpret?, are the basic interrogatives of constitutional interpretation. See Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming & Sotirios A. Barber, American Constitutional Interpretation
(2d ed. 1995).

2. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353
(1981).
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Ronald Dworkin has long recognized that these fundamental questions of What and How are the central questions of fidelity. From his
first book, Taking Rights Seriously,3 to his recent book, Freedom's
Law,' Dworkin has argued that commitment to interpretive fidelity
requires that we recognize that the Constitution embodies abstract
moral principles rather than laying down particular historical conceptions and that interpreting and applying those principles require fresh
judgments of political theory about how they are best understood. He
now calls this interpretive strategy the "moral reading" of the Constitution. Yet, narrow originalists such as Robert H. Bork and Justice
Antonin Scalia have asserted a monopoly on concern for fidelity in
constitutional interpretation, claiming that fidelity requires following
the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the relatively specific original understanding of, the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution.5
They have charged that constitutional theorists who reject these
claims are "revisionists" who disregard fidelity, thereby subverting the
Constitution. Dworkin has vigorously and cogently punctured the
narrow originalists' pretensions to a monopoly on fidelity, arguing
that commitment to fidelity entails that we pursue integrity with the
and that they, the narrow originalmoral reading of the Constitution
6
ists, are the real "revisionists."
This Symposium implicitly challenges the narrow originalists' claim
to a monopoly on fidelity, for it features several competing conceptions of fidelity. It illustrates two strategies for responding to the
claim of the narrow originalists. Dworkin takes the first: Tuin the
tables on the narrow originalists. He argues that commitment to fidelity entails the very approach that they are at pains to insist it forbids,
and prohibits the very approach that they imperiously maintain it
mandates. The second is taken by Bruce Ackerman and Lawrence
Lessig, to say nothing of Lessig's sometime co-author, Cass R. Sun-

3. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 131-49 (1977) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously].
4. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 1-38, 72-83 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom's Law]; see also Ronald
Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1249 (1997).
5. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849
(1989).
6. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 74-76; Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 125-29
(1993) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life's Dominion]. I take the term "integrity" from
Dworkin's conception of "law as integrity." See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 176275 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's Empire]. For an insightful analysis of Dworkin's general conception of legal reasoning in relation to fidelity, see Gregory C.
Keating, Fidelity to Pre-Existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1 (1993).
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stein: Beat the narrow originalists at their own game.7 Ackerman,
Lessig, and Sunstein advance fidelity as synthesis and fidelity as translation as "broad" or "soft" forms of originalism that are superior, as
conceptions of originalism, to narrow originalism. What is "broad" or
"soft" about their forms of originalism is that these theorists conceive
original understanding at a considerably higher level of abstraction
than do the narrow originalists.8 At the same time, they argue that
the quest for fidelity requires that we reject Dworkin's moral reading.9
Indeed, Lessig and Sunstein make the Borkish suggestion that Dworkin's project is not one of fidelity, but one of improvement. 10 Thus,
the broad originalists attempt to develop an intermediate theory between narrow originalism and the moral reading.
Dworkin argues that the search for an intermediate theory is pointless and that the moral reading is the only coherent strategy for interpreting the Constitution." I shall explore the reasons for
constitutional theorists' resistance to the moral reading, and for their
persistence in searching for an intermediate theory in the form of a
broad originalism. Dworkin offers one reason: They are in the grip of
an unfounded assumption, the "majoritarian premise," which leads
them to reject the moral reading on democratic grounds. In Part I, I
critique his analysis. Then, in Part II,
I put forward a second reason,
which centers on the idea of fidelity: They are in the hold of another
7. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) [hereinafter Ackerman, We the People]; Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordlamm L
Rev. 1519 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 Fordham L Rev. 1365
(1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Constraint]; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed
Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity
in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity]; Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R.Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 Colum. L Rev. 1
(1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning]. Other works illustrating the emergence of a form of
broad originalism include Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or
Politics? (1994); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995); William M. Treanor, The OriginalUnderstanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L Rev. 782 (1995).
8. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 7, at 171-82; Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1992).
9. For an example of Lessig's rejection of Dworkin's moral reading, see Lessig,
Fidelity, supra note 7, at 1259-61. For an example of Sunstein's rejection of Dworkin's
moral reading in favor of an alternative moral reading, see Cass R. Sunstein, Earl
Warren Is Dead, New Republic, May 13, 1996, at 35 (reviewing Dworkin, Freedom's
Law, supra note 4). For Ackerman's rejection of Dworkin's "rights foundationalism"
in favor of his own conception of "dualist democracy," see Ackerman, We the People,
supra note 7, at 6-16. For examples of interpretations of Ackerman's work as an attempt to develop a broad form of originalism, see Flaherty, supra note 7, at 579-90
James E. Fleming, We the ExceptionalAmerican People, 11 Const. Commentary 355,
369-70 (1994); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale LJ. 1493, 1521-23 (1988);
Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 Harv. L Rev. 918, 933-34 (1992)
(reviewing Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7).
10. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 11 n.35, 85 n336.
11. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 14, 18.
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problematic assumption, the "originalist premise," which causes them
to reject the moral reading on "fidelist" grounds. I contend that the
broad originalists, like the narrow originalists, fundamentally misconceive fidelity. The commitment to fidelity to the Constitution entails,
as Dworkin argues, that we should interpret it so as to make it the best
it can be. 2 But broad originalists such as Lessig mistake this commitment to fidelity as proof that Dworkin is an "infidel. ' 13 Ironically, in
the name of interpretive fidelity, the broad originalists, like the narrow originalists, would enshrine an imperfect Constitution that does
not deserve our fidelity. Only under the moral reading do we have
much hope of interpreting our imperfect Constitution in a manner
that might deserve our fidelity. 4 Finally, in Part III, I suggest that the
moral reading is a big tent, and urge liberal and progressive theorists
who have resisted the moral reading in favor of questing for a broad
originalism to reconceive their work as coming within it: in particular,
as being in service of the moral reading by providing a firmer grounding for the moral reading in fit with historical materials than Dworkin
has offered.
I. THE MORAL

READING AND THE MAJORITARIAN PREMISE

In Freedom's Law, Dworkin argues that the moral reading of the
Constitution is more faithful than the originalist strategy is to the text
of the Constitution and the conception of democracy it presupposes.
He contends that "the only substantial objection to the moral reading,
which takes the text seriously, is that it offends democracy."' Moreover, he argues that constitutional lawyers and scholars who make this
objection are in the 6 grip of an unfounded assumption, the
"majoritarian premise."' This is the assumption that the fundamental
value or point of democracy is commitment to the goal of majority
12. Dworkin, Law's Em pire, supra note 6, at 176-275; Ronald Dworkin, A Matter
of Principle 146-66 (1985) [hereinafter Dworkin, A Matter of Principle].
13. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 7, at 1260.
14. Elsewhere, I have characterized the constitutional theory that I am developing, constitutional constructivism, as a "Constitution-perfecting theory," as distinguished from a "process-perfecting theory." See James E. Fleming, Constructing the
Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 215, 217 (1993) [hereinafter Fleming,
Constructing]. I mean "perfecting" in the sense of interpreting the Constitution with
integrity so as to render it a coherent whole, not in Monaghan's caricatured sense of
"Our perfect Constitution" as a perfect liberal utopia. See Monaghan, supra note 2, at
356. Dworkin addresses the "perfect Constitution" objection, which is that his interpretations of the Constitution always seem to have "happy endings" or "liberal endings." Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 36. He concedes that the
Constitution is not perfect, for it does not protect "all the important principles of
political liberalism." Id.Nonetheless, he argues that "[i]t is in the nature of legal
interpretation-not just but particularly constitutional interpretation-to aim at
happy endings." Id.at 38. In that sense, Dworkin's moral reading is also a Constitution-perfecting theory.
15. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 15.
16. Id.at 16.
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will. This premise undergirds a majoritarian conception of democracy
that is not true to our scheme of government and that indeed obscures
the true character and importance of our system. 17 As an alternative,
Dworkin offers a constitutional conception of democracy which conceives the fundamental point or value of democracy to be concern for
the equal status of citizens.' 8 He then considers and rejects three arguments for the majoritarian premise, which are rooted in liberty,
equality, and community. 19 I believe that Dworkin's arguments for
the moral reading and against democratic objections rooted in the
majoritarian premise are sound. My critique of his arguments regarding the majoritarian premise is largely sympathetic and mostly architectural, that is, it focuses on how he frames and structures certain
issues and arguments.2 °
First, Dworkin is right to lay bare and criticize the majoritarian
premise and the majoritarian conception of democracy that stems
from it. For too long, that premise and conception have hobbled constitutional theory by providing a misguided and misleading account of
our constitutional scheme. They have driven constitutional theorists
to regard as deviant or anomalous certain integral features of that
scheme. Most famously, that premise and conception underlie Alexander M. Bickel's anxious claim that judicial review is a "deviant institution" that poses a "counter-majoritarian difficulty" in our
democracy. 2 ' Dworkin in effect turns Bickel on his head, ' for Dworkin's formulation of the "majoritarian premise" as an unfounded assumption is the inverted mirror image of Bickel's formulation of the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" as the root problem. On Dworkin's
view, the fact that many constitutional theorists are obsessed with the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" presents a serious problem, because
it obscures from them the true character of our system and prevents
them from embracing the moral reading.
But Dworkin would be wrong to suggest-and I do not believe that
he does so-that all democratic objections to the moral reading, in
particular those advanced by the broad originalists, are rooted in the
majoritarian premise and the majoritarian conception of democracy.
For example, Sunstein makes democratic objections to Dworkin's
moral reading from the standpoint of his own non-majoritarian con17.
18.
19.
20.

Id at 15-17.
Id at 17-18.
Id at 21-31.
I should, however, point out a terminological quibble: Dworkin's term for his

interpretive strategy, the "moral reading," unfortunately may suggest that he believes
that constitutional interpretation is a matter of moral theory, whereas in fact he contends that it requires recourse to political theory.
21. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16, 18 (2d ed. 1986).

22. Similarly, Sunstein has suggested that Dworkin has stood Judge Learned Hand
on his head. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 36.
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ception of democracy-deliberative democracy-and of his less abstract, more pragmatic conception of legal reasoning.2 3 Moreover,
Sunstein advances these objections through developing an alternative
moral reading of the Constitution, rather than rejecting completely
the idea of a moral reading. This form of criticism is presumably the
type that Dworkin would welcome, for it engages the idea of a moral
reading rather than wholly rejecting it. 4
Second, Dworkin is largely correct in criticizing, as confused and
misconceived, the widely-held view that protection of individual rights
against majoritarian political processes offends or compromises democracy in order to protect other values. As discussed below, he argues that such rights are "democratic conditions."' But it is troubling
that he frames the issue as "a debate not about how far democracy
should yield to other values, but about what democracy, accurately
understood, really is."26 Dworkin also puts the question in terms of
"what democracy means," "what true democracy is," what is "the very
essence of democracy,"
and "what the democratic conditions, in de'2 7
tail, really are."
Dworkin's formulations sound uncharacteristically and unnecessarily Platonic or essentialist, and I fear that they may make some readers wary about accepting his arguments. These readers need
reassurance that if we have to talk about political theory in constitutional interpretation, we are going to talk about the political theory of
our constitutional scheme, not the essence or real or true meaning of
democracy in the abstract. It is better to frame these issues in more
characteristically Dworkinian terms. For example, what conception of
democracy best fits and justifies our constitutional text and practice? 28
Or, what conception of democracy is soundest as an account of our
constitutional document and tradition? These formulations underscore that we are asking questions of bounded political theory about
our constitutional text and underlying scheme, not elaborating moral
principles in the abstract purely as a matter of unbounded political
theory.29
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Partial Constitution]; Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 7.
24. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 38.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
26. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 15.
27. Id. at 15, 16, 18.
28. For examples of Dworkin's formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and justification, see Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 6, at 239;
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, supra note 12, at 143-45; Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously, supra note 3, at 107.
29. For an argument that Dworkin's constitutional theory is too bounded by the
legal materials of our constitutional text and underlying constitutional order, and not
utopian enough (or not sufficiently a matter of "pure political philosophy"), see Edward B. Foley, Interpretation and Philosophy: Dworkin's Constitution, 14 Const.
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Third, Dworkin is correct in arguing that a constitutional conception of democracy better fits and justifies our constitutional text and
practice than does a majoritarian conception of democracy. He is persuasive in contending that protection of, and respect for, rights that
are the conditions for moral membership in our political community
are themselves preconditions for the legitimacy of the outcomes of
majoritarian political processes."0 Here Dworkin appears to have
31
taken a page out of John Hart Ely's book, Democracy and Distnst,
in arguing for conceiving our rights as preconditions for the legitimacy
or trustworthiness of democracy. But unlike Ely, Dworkin would indude, among the conditions of democracy, certain "substantive"
rights such as moral independence, in addition to "procedural" rights
like the right to vote.32
Dworkin is mostly right about what the conditions of moral membership in our political community are. But the architecture of his
constitutional theory is problematic. I fear that Dworkin's characterization of all of these substantive and procedural rights as "democratic
conditions" may lead to unnecessary trouble and resistance. Many
readers may resist his argument that substantive rights like moral independence are "democratic conditions." Even if they grant that both
substantive and procedural rights must be protected for the outcomes
of the majoritarian political processes to be legitimate or trustworthy,
they may suspect that he is pulling a fast one, or making it too easy, or
being too clever by packing all of the rights that constrain majoritarian
political processes into the "democratic conditions. 3 3 To observe, as
Dworkin might, that such readers' objections seem to presuppose the
unfounded majoritarian premise may be true, but unhelpful if the aim
is to persuade them to abandon it.
I believe that there is a more straightforward and plausible theoretical structure through which to present conceptions of constitutional
democracy like Dworkin's. Elsewhere, I criticize the architecture of
constitutional theories such as those of Ely and Sunstein, which attempt to frame or recast all of our basic liberties, both substantive and
procedural, as preconditions for representative or deliberative democCommentary (forthcoming 1997); Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1313 (1997).
30. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 24; see Dworkin, Life's Dominion,
supra note 6, at 123.
31. John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
32. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 24-26, 349 n.5. For Dworkin's earlier critique of Ely, see Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L Rev.
469 (1981), reprintedin Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, supra note 12, at 33 [hereinafter Dworkin, The Forum of Principle].
33. Lawrence G. Sager has made a similar critique of the architecture of Dworkin's theory, although his primary focus was on the theories of Ely, Ackerman, and
Frank Michelman. See Lawrence G. Sager, The IncorrigibleConstitution, 65 N.Y.U. L

Rev. 893, 942-48 (1990) (criticizing Dworkin's "constitutive account").
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racy. 3' I argue instead for a constitutional constructivism, a conception of constitutional democracy with two fundamental themes: first,
securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for a conception of
justice to deliberating about the justice of basic institutions and social
policies, and second, securing the basic liberties that are preconditions
for deliberativeautonomy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for
a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding how to
live their own lives. Together, these themes afford everyone the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy.35 (This conception has deep
affinities to Dworkin's view that the fundamental point or value of36
our
scheme of government is concern for the equal status of citizens.) I
present this understanding of constitutional democracy as a hybrid
scheme or synthesis of the traditions of constitutionalism and democracy, liberalism and republicanism, and the liberties of the modems
and the liberties of the ancients.37 I offer my account, constitutional
constructivism, as the guiding framework that best fits and justifies
our constitutional text and underlying constitutional order, not as an
account of "what democracy means" or of "what the democratic conditions, in detail, really are."
Moreover, I contend elsewhere that there are good reasons for conceiving our basic liberties in terms of securing the preconditions for
deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy instead of framing
them as, or reducing them into, preconditions for democracy.3 8 The
first reason is prophylactic: Articulating a constitutional constructivism with these two themes protects us against taking flights from substance to process by recasting substantive liberties as procedural
liberties or neglecting them. The second, related reason is architectonic: Presenting our basic liberties in these terms illustrates that the
two fundamental themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy are co-original and of equal weight. The third, more general reason is heuristic: Articulating our basic liberties through these
two themes keeps in view that our constitutional scheme is a dualist
constitutional democracy, not a monist or majoritarian representative
democracy. A final reason is elegance: the importance of being elegant (though not too reductive) in constructing a constitutional the34. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 14-16
(1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing]; Fleming, Constructing,supra note 14, at 249-

60.

35. Fleming, Securing, supra note 34, at 2-3, 17-29; Fleming, Constructing, supra
note 14, at 217-20, 280-97. I develop this theory by analogy to John Rawls's political
constructivism. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993).
36. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 17.
37. Fleming, Securing, supra note 34, at 24-27; Fleming, Constructing, supra note
14, at 252-55.
38. Fleming, Securing, supra note 34, at 27-29.
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ory. I originally advanced these reasons for adopting the architecture
of a constitutional constructivism with the foregoing two themes as
part of a critique of the architecture of process-perfecting theories
such as Sunstein's, which recast our basic liberties, substantive and
procedural, as preconditions for deliberative democracy, but they also
apply with some force to the architecture of Dworkin's conception of
such basic liberties as preconditions for democracy. That is, the architecture of a constitutional theory with these two themes, which together secure the preconditions for constitutional democracy, has
these advantages over the architecture of Dworkin's theory.
Finally, Dworkin is right to conceive courts as a "forum of principle,"39 while recognizing
that legislatures and executives are also
"guardians of principle."' 4 Some liberals and progressives, emphasizing Dworkin's conception of courts as "the forum of principle," have
criticized his theory for being too court-centered and for ignoring "the
Constitution outside the courts."'" That criticism, although understandable, is plainly overstated. Dworkin has always made clear, and
again makes clear in Freedom's Law, that legislatures, executives, and
citizens also have responsibilities to interpret the Constitution.42 Sanford Levinson recognized this early on, and appropriately interpreted
Dworkin as a constitutional "protestant" instead of a court-centered
"catholic" on the question, Who is to interpret the Constitution?43
Dworkin makes a nod in the direction of endorsing Lawrence G.
Sager's well-known view that certain constitutional principles required
by political justice are judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may
impose affirmative obligations outside the courts on legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to realize them more fully." Sager's
view is an important component of a full moral reading or justiceseeking account of the Constitution. For it helps make sense of the
evident "thinness" or "moral shortfall" of constitutional law, while
still offering a moral reading or justice-seeking account.4 I would
39. Dworkin, The Forwn of Principle,supra note 32.
40. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 31.

41. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 7, at 59-60; Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 23, at 9, 145-46, 374 n.35.
42. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 31.
43. Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 123, 141 (interpreting Dworkin as a constitutional "protestant" on the question "Who is to interpret the Constitution?"); see Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Faith 42-44 (1988). Dworkin has also referred to his approach on this question as a
"protestant" approach. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 6, at 190, 413.
44. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 33-34. For Sager's view, see Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal

Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
45. For a justice-seeking account or moral reading of the Constitution that is
thicker, or countenances less moral shortfall through judicial underenforcement than
does Sager's view, see Sotirios A Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power (1993)
[hereinafter Barber, Power]; Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means
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urge Dworkin to consider adopting such a view. (Of course many
questions would remain concerning what is and what is not judicially
enforceable.) I believe that he could do so without undermining his
arguments against the majoritarian premise.
II.

THE

MORAL READING AND THE ORIGINALIST PREMISE

Next, I shall consider another reason why the broad originalists
have resisted the moral reading, which centers on the idea of fidelity:
They are in the grip of what I shall call the "originalist premise." This
is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or
indeed the only, conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation.
On this view, fidelity by definition, or at least as practiced in our constitutional culture, must be concerned with following the original
meaning of the text, the original understanding of the framers and
ratifiers, or the like. The originalist premise leads to objections to the
moral reading on the ground that it is "nonoriginalist," "revisionist,"
or not "fidelist."
The originalist premise is expressed in its most extreme form by
Judge Robert Bork, who asserts that originalism is the only possible
approach to constitutional interpretation that is faithful to the historic
Constitution and consonant with the constitutional design. He rejects
all other approaches, most especially those like Dworkin's, as "revisionist."46 In recent years, the originalist premise has also been manifested in the emerging strain of broad originalism in liberal and
progressive constitutional theory. For example, Lessig evidently takes
the view that originalism, by definition, is the only method of fidelity.
Most strikingly, he has made the Borkish assertion that Dworkin is an
"infidel," and he and Sunstein have suggested that Dworkin does not
even have a method of fidelity.4 7 I believe that the originalist premise,
as much as the majoritarian premise, drives the broad originalists'
resistance to Dworkin's moral reading.
In unpacking what I have loosely called the originalist premise, I
shall examine several reasons why some liberal and progressive constitutional theorists have resisted Dworkin's moral reading in favor of
(1984) [hereinafter Barber, Constitution]; Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental Constitution, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the Fordham Law Review); Sotirios A. Barber, Justice-Seeking Constitutionalism and
Its Critics, paper presented at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on
Constitutional Theory (Apr. 20, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review); see Sotirios A. Barber, Fidelity and ConstitutionalAspirations,65
Fordham L. Rev. 1757 (1997).
46. Bork, supra note 5, at 187-240. This is the obligatory footnote where I must
acknowledge that Raoul Berger is more extreme than Bork (or, for that matter,
Scalia). See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (1977).
47. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 7, at 1260; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 11
n.35, 85 n.336.
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searching for an intermediate theory in the form of a broad originalism. More generally, I discuss the reasons for the emergence of this
strain of broad originalism. I contend that none of these reasons is a
good reason for the broad originalists not to endorse the moral reading, properly conceived. My general stance is to support broad
originalism to the extent that its proponents undertake it in service of
the moral reading, but to criticize it to the extent that they believe it is
sustainable as an alternative to the moral reading.
A.

The Turns to History and to Text, History, and Structure

First, the broad originalists seek to reclaim history, and indeed the
aspiration to fidelity, from the narrow originalists. They believe that
liberals and progressives ignored or neglected history for so long that
they practically ceded it to conservatives.'8 The broad originalists undertook the "turn to history" to show that their constitutional theories, aspirations, and ideals are firmly rooted in our constitutional
history and practice, and indeed provide a better account of our constitutional text and tradition than do those of the conservative narrow
originalists.
The liberal and progressive project of reclaiming history and fidelity
from the narrow originalists is understandable and laudable. But it is
understandable and laudable if undertaken in service of the moral
reading, not as an alternative to it. This project would explain a turn
to history, but not necessarily a turn to originalism. They are not the
same thing.49 And it would explain a turn to history in order to pur-

sue an historically grounded moral reading. But it would not necessarily explain a turn to history that turns away from the moral reading.
The turn to history should not become an escape into history.50 Why
not conceive the turn to history as doing "fit" work in support of a
liberal or progressive moral reading rather than as a broad form of
originalism that rejects the moral reading?
Second, more generally, these liberals and progressives aim to
ground their arguments in the text, history, and structure of the Constitution, and they believe that a broad originalism is more promising
along these lines than is the moral reading.5 ' Some recite this trilogy
of sources of constitutional meaning as if it were a litany. Like the
48. See Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 132-63 (1996).
49. The major criticism I have of Kalman's fine book is that she seems to treat the

turn to history and the turn to originalism as if they were the same thing.
50. See Calvin Woodard, Escape into History, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 15, 1996, § 7
(Book Review), at 33 (reviewing Kalman, supra note 48).
51. Among the enthusiasts of text, history, and structure are Sunstein, Akhil
Amar, and Jeffrey Rosen. See Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 23, at 119-22;
Akhil R. Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Terrualism, and Populism, 65

Fordham L. Rev. 1657 (1997); Akhil R. Amar & Vikram D. Amar, Is the Presidential
Succession Law Constitutional?,48 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1995); Jeffrey Rosen, A Womb
with a View, New Republic, June 14, 1993, at 35 (reviewing Dworkin, Life's Domin-
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turn to history, the turn to text, history, and structure is an understandable and worthy project. Liberals and progressives should firmly
ground their arguments in text, history, and structure, not to mention
practice, tradition, and culture. But this turn is not necessarily a turn
to originalism and against the moral reading. Indeed, recourse to
structure in constitutional interpretation typically involves drawing inferences from political theory, not merely recovering, translating, or
extrapolating from the original meaning of the text.52 The turn to
text, history, and structure becomes a turn against the moral reading
only if its proponents claim to be elaborating text, history, and structure without making recourse to political theory. Such a claim would
be problematic and implausible. Why, then, do the liberal and progressive enthusiasts of text, history, and structure cast their arguments
as broad originalist arguments rather than as arguments in support of
better grounding the moral reading?
Third, I suggest that the answer to the question-Why have the
turns to history and to text, history, and structure become turns to
broad originalism and against the moral reading?-is to be found in
considerations of litigation strategy or judgments about the types of
arguments that are appropriate in our constitutional culture. The
thought seems to be that our constitutional culture is largely originalist (or positivist), and therefore that arguments in constitutional law,
to be successful, simply must be framed in an originalist mold. A view
of this sort seems to animate the work of broad originalists such as
Ackerman, Lessig, and Akhil Amar. I have heard a strong version of
this view articulated roughly as follows: The only way that liberals
and progressives have any hope of persuading Justice Scalia to accept
their interpretations of the Constitution is to make originalist
arguments.
To this view I have four responses. (1) The attempt to persuade
Scalia that fidelity to the Constitution leads to any liberal or progressive conclusions is a fool's errand. There can be no serious doubt that
Scalia's mind is ideologically impervious to liberal or progressive constitutional arguments.5 3 Worse yet, this attempt disfigures and debases constitutional theory by causing theorists to recast their
arguments in a narrow originalist mold dictated by Scalia.
ion, supra note 6); "Life's Dominion": An Exchange, New Republic, Sept. 6, 1993, at
43 (exchange between Dworkin and Rosen concerning Rosen's book review, supra).
52. For examples of accounts of inferences from structure that recognize this, see
Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969); Wil-

liam F. Harris, II, The Interpretable Constitution 144-58 (1993); Fleming, Securing,
supra note 34, at 4-6 (furthering the "unfinished business of Charles Black").

53. Notwithstanding possible appearances to the contrary, Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989), and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), are not counterexamples. For instructive analyses of Scalia's jurisprudence, as manifested in these
decisions, see Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 124 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 24, 40-45 (1992).
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(2) It is telling that the greatest liberal constitutional theorist-litigator of our time, Laurence H. Tribe, has not adapted his constitutional
theory to such an originalist litigation strategy. To be sure, he has
eschewed grand theory, as if to say, "no theorists here, just us common lawyers." But his conception of constitutional interpretation in
his academic writing is much closer to Dworkin's theory than to the
broad originalist views of Ackerman, Lessig, and Amar.
(3) Our constitutional culture is not as originalist as the broad
originalists seem to assume. It certainly requires constitutional lawyers and scholars to pay homage to history and to fit with historical
materials, but that is not to say that it is originalist. 55 Originalism is an
ism, a conservative ideology that emerged in reaction against the Warren Court. Before Richard Nixon and Robert Bork launched their
attacks on the Warren Court, originalism as we know it did not exist.56
Constitutional interpretation in light of original understanding did exist, but original understanding was regarded as merely one source of
constitutional meaning among several, not a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive legitimate theory. Indeed, history was regarded as secondary to, and merely as extrinsic
evidence of, the meaning of text and structure.57 Scholars wrote about
the "uses of history" in constitutional interpretation rather than contending that enforcing original understanding was the only defensible
conception of fidelity.58 Moreover, original understanding, especially
at a relatively specific level, was understood to be largely indetermi-

54. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 17,
81-87 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L Rev. 1223 (1995)
(criticizing the (broad originalist) theories of Ackerman and Amar); Laurence H.
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutional Theories,89 Yale LJ.
1063, 1072-77 (1980), reprinted in Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 9 (1985)
(retitled The Pointless Flight from Substance) (criticizing Ely's theory for taking a
"pointless flight from substance," just as Dworkin critiqued Ely's theory for doing so,
see Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,supra note 32). For a critique of the broad
originalist theories of Ackerman and Lessig from a theoretical perspective similar to
Tribe's, see Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of OriginalMeaning, 86 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
55. The Senate's rejection of the Bork nomination was at least in part a rejection
of Bork's narrow originalism. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 276-86,
287-305.
56. William W. Crosskey may be an exception, but he was roundly criticized as
exceptional. See, eg., Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor Crosskey and JudicialReview, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1456 (1954) (reviewing William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953)).
57. See Jacobus tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme
Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 Cal. L Rev. 287 (1938).
58. See Charles A. Mftller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969);
John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light The Uses of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 502 (1964).
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nate and inconclusive. As Justice Jackson famously put it in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:59
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to
interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate and
scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or
less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice
of dealing with the largest
60
questions in the most narrow way.
Regrettably, many constitutional lawyers and scholars in recent years
seem to have lost sight of this great wisdom. It is important to note
that Laura Kalman, in her fine intellectual history of recent constitutional theory, has practically suggested that the best professional historians know better than to be originalists, but that some
constitutional
lawyers and scholars who have taken the turn to history
61
do not.
(4) Finally, we should put the following question to the broad
originalists: If our constitutional culture is so originalist, why do so
many originalists complain that so many constitutional law cases and
so many features of our constitutional practice cannot be justified on
the basis of originalism? 62 The answer is that our constitutional culture is not as originalist as the broad originalists have supposed. Or
that its commitment to originalism is more honored in the breach than
in the observance. Or that Dworkin is right in arguing that "[s]o far as
American lawyers and judges follow any coherent strategy of interpreting the Constitution at all, they already use the moral reading,"
but that there is a confused "mismatch" between the role of the moral
reading, which is embedded in our constitutional
practice, and its rep63
utation, which is that it is illegitimate.
B.

The Celebration of "Fit"to the Exclusion of "Justification"

Another reason why some liberal and progressive constitutional
theorists resist the moral reading and attempt to develop a broad
originalism is that they believe that Dworkin's theory does not take
59. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
60. Id at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
61. Kalman, supra note 48, at 167-90; see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 3-22
(1996); Joyce Appleby, Constitutional Conventions, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1996, § 7
(Book Review), at 20 (reviewing Rakove, supra). But see Rakove, supra at 7 (criticizing Jackson for overstating the point in the passage from Youngstown quoted m text).
62. See Bork, supra note 5; Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional

Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723 (1988). For a highly instructive analysis of the

gap between originalist theory and our constitutional practice, see Dorf, supra note
54.
63. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 2, 4.
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history and "fit" seriously enough, or that it suffers from a "problem
of fit."' Their objection has two aspects. In the first place, they
claim, Dworkin does not do the concrete groundwork necessary to
show that his interpretations of the Constitution adequately fit the historical materials including original understanding and precedents. In
the final analysis, they claim, he will too readily reject as mistakes any
historical materials that do not fit his political theory. For both reasons, they are dubious about whether Dworkin's theory, as Dworkin
himself practices it, actually constrains constitutional interpretation to
be faithful to anything other than his own liberal political theory.
In response, I would distinguish between Dworkin's theory of fidelity as integrity with the moral reading and Dworkin's own application
of it, and urge: "Do as Dworkin says, not as he does." That is, I
would argue that Dworkin's theory of fidelity as integrity is the best
conception of fidelity, but would concede that Dworkin himself may
not always satisfactorily do the fit work that his own theory calls for,
or that he may do it too abstractly to satisfy these critics that he takes
fit as seriously as he should. Dworkin's splendid essays in constitutional theory in the New York Review of Books may aggravate such
concerns. He writes these essays in a style designed to reach and persuade a larger audience of citizens, not in a technical style to demonstrate to constitutional lawyers and scholars that he has done his
historical homework. Ironically, to the extent that Dworkin has indeed become, in T.M. Scanlon's estimation, "our leading public philosopher, ' 65 he may have diminished the appeal of his theory and his
work to some constitutional lawyers and scholars. For in their view,
his "public philosophy" may not provide a good model for the kind of
scholarship that shows the proper regard for the aspiration to fidelity,
and that gives fit as well as justification its due.
Furthermore, some broad originalists evidently resist Dworkin's
moral reading because they believe, as Bruce Ackerman once put it,
that "fit is everything."' To state the matter in terms of Dworkin's
well-known argument that the best interpretation has two dimensions-fit and justification-they seem to believe that fidelity is purely
a matter of fit with historical materials, rather than also a matter of

64. For a broad originalist claim that Dworkin does not take fit seriously enough,
see Flaherty, supra note 7. For a positivist claim that Dworkin's theory suffers from a
"problem of fit," see Anthony 3. Sebok, The Insatiable Constitution,70 S. Cal. L Rev.
(forthcoming 1997). For a narrow originalist critique along these lines, see Michael
W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in JudicialReview: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "MoralReading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1269 (1997).
65. T.M. Scanlon, Partisanfor Life, N.Y. Rev. Books, July 15, 1993, at 45, 45 (reviewing Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 6).
66. See Bruce Ackerman, Remarks at the New York University School of Law
Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993 (colloquy between Ackerman
and Dworkin).
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justification in political theory. 67 Fit and history do have a role in the
quest for fidelity to the Constitution, but a limited one. We should
acknowledge the place of history in constitutional interpretation-as a
constraint that comes into play in the dimension of fit-but should
keep it in its place. Broad originalists tend to exaggerate the place of
history and to give it a greater role than it deserves and than it is
capable of playing.
History is, can only be, and should only be a starting point in constitutional interpretation. It has a threshold role, which is often not dispositive. In the dimension of fit, it helps (or should help) screen out
"off-the-wall" interpretations or purely utopian interpretations, but
often does not lead conclusively to any interpretation, let alone the
best interpretation. History usually provides a foothold for competing
interpretations or competing theories. It alone cannot resolve the
clash among these competing interpretations or competing theories.
Deciding which theory provides the best interpretation is not an historical matter of reading more cases, tracts, or speeches or more scrupulously doing good professional history. To resolve the clash among
competing interpretations or competing theories, we must move beyond the threshold dimension of fit to the dimension of justification.
History rarely has anything useful, much less dispositive, to say at that
point.68 In deciding which interpretation among competing acceptably fitting interpretations is most faithful to the Constitution, we must
ask further questions: Which interpretation provides the best justification, which makes our constitutional scheme the best it can be,
which does it more credit, or which answers better to our best aspirations as a people? 69 These questions are not those of an "infidel,"
Lessig notwithstanding.7 ° They are required by the quest for fidelity
in the sense of honoring our aspirational principles, not merely following our historical practices or the original meaning of the text.7 ' And
the commitment to fidelity is an aspiration to the best interpretation
of the Constitution, not merely to best fit with the historical materials
or original meaning (or best translation of them). The view that fidel67. For Dworkin's formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation, fit
and justification, see sources cited supra in note 28.
68. Indeed, as stated above, the best professional historians know better than to
be originalists; unfortunately, some constitutional lawyers and scholars do not. See
supra text accompanying note 61.
69. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 8-11; Dworkin, Law's Empire,
supra note 6, at 176-275.

70. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 7, at 1260.
71. For development of the idea that the Constitution embodies aspirational principles rather than merely codifying historical practices, see Fleming, Securing, supra
note 34, at 56-59; Fleming, Constructing,supra note 14, at 268-73. For similar ideas,
see Barber, Power, supra note 45, at 60-61; Barber, Constitution, supra note 45, at 8485; Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1261, 1312-20 (1991);

Michelman, supra note 9, at 1496, 1514.
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ity is merely a matter of fit-or that "fit is everything"-mistakenly
assumes that the Constitution is defined, and exhausted, by the historical materials.
More generally, some broad originalists may resist the moral reading because they believe that fidelity requires following historical
materials and eschewing political theory. But broad originalists understand constitutional interpretation in terms of "liberating abstraction," or conceive original understanding at a relatively high level of
abstraction.' When they elaborate abstract original understanding,
they will find that they are not able to do so purely as a matter of
historical research, translation, or extrapolation. Instead, they will
have to do so as a matter of and through recourse to bounded political
theory. Ackerman and Sunstein well understand this, despite believing that the political theory is more bounded or less abstract than
Dworkin contemplates, but it appears that Lessig may not. Lessig, in
the hold of the originalist premise, evidently believes that fidelity in
constitutional interpretation must mean fidelity to the original meaning of the text, and that interpretation must mean recovery of original
meaning or translation from one historical context to another to the
virtual exclusion of elaborating concepts through doing political
theory.73
I admire the ambition of Lessig's project of developing a conception
of fidelity as translation, but I believe that it is question-begging and
wrong-headed. It begs the question with which I began-Fidelityto
what?-by assuming without arguing that the answer is fidelity to
original meaning of the text. Lessig simply announces that this is our
practice and that he is going to give an account of it without justifying
74
it.
Lessig's project is wrong-headed in that it is deeply in thrall to
Scalia (for whom Lessig clerked). Lessig concedes to Scalia that fidelity must be a quest for original meaning, and then advances a two-step
conception of fidelity as translation as an alternative to Scalia's onestep method. 'With all due respect, it will take more fancy footwork
than a two-step for Lessig to get around or beyond the problems of
Scalia's narrow originalism.
Furthermore, Lessig takes the metaphor of translation too seriously
and too literally. As a general metaphor, the idea of translation is
evocative. As a specific method, it misconceives the nature of interpretation of abstract constitutional texts. Justice Jackson has the right
72. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 7, at 171-82; Ackerman, Liberating
Abstraction, supra note 8.
73. In his first article developing his conception of fidelity as translation, Lessig
seemed to hold such a view. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 7. His article in this
Symposium may suggest that he has qualified it. See Lessig, Constraint,supra note 7.
74. Lessig, Fidelity,supra note 7, at 1173.
75. Id.at 1182-94. Briefly, the one-step fidelist asks only, "What was the original
meaning of the text?," whereas the two-step fidelist also asks how to translate the
original meaning into the current context.
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idea about interpretation 76as translation in his famous formulation in
West Virginia v. Barnette:
True, the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with
the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence ....But we act in these matters not77by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions.
When Jackson characterizes interpretation as "translating" the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, he is conceiving translation as a
general metaphor for interpretation of an abstract text. Dworkin conceives interpretation as translation along similar lines. 78 But interpretation of the majestic generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, does not typically involve translation of original meaning of
the text, as if that had been elaborated and were relatively determinate in a detailed text, from one context to another. Rather, it more
typically involves elaboration of abstract moral principles, which requires fresh judgments of political theory about how these principles
are best understood. Translation as a specific method, rather than
merely a general metaphor, may be helpful in thinking about how to
interpret relatively determinate texts; it is not as helpful in thinking
about how to interpret majestically abstract texts. Dworkin's metaphor of the chain novel is more helpful than Lessig's metaphor of
translation: "[J]udges are [more] like authors jointly creating a chain
novel in which each writes a chapter that makes sense as part of the
story as a whole" 79 than they are like translators of the original meaning of the text.
C. The Democratic Turn
A final reason why liberals and progressives have sought to develop
a broad originalism is that they believe it is more democratic than the
moral reading. I shall not examine this reason in detail here, because
my focus is on fidelist objections to the moral reading rather than
democratic objections. But I should say three things. First, as stated
above, Dworkin has responded effectively to certain democratic objections by showing that they rest upon the unfounded majoritarian
premise. 80 Second, the argument that a broad originalism is more
democratic than a moral reading ignores the fact that the broad
originalists agree for the most part with Dworkin and similar proponents of the moral reading about what basic liberties properly constrain the majoritarian political processes; the disagreement is largely
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
ld at 639-40.
Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 8-9.
Id at 10.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
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about how best to justify protecting those basic liberties against
majoritarian encroachment. To the extent that the broad originalists
disagree with proponents of the moral reading about what our basic
liberties are, their claims that a broad originalism is more democratic
tend either to rest upon the majoritarian premise, or to beg the question of what conception of democracy best fits and justifies our
scheme. 8 ' Finally, the broad originalists' claim that their theories are
more democratic than the moral reading seems to depend ultimately
in part upon the view that their theories have better grounded those
basic liberties in our historical materials. To that extent, the democratic objection to the moral reading shades over into a fidelist objection, which I have addressed.'
III.

RECONCEIVING THE MORAL READING AS A

BIG

TENT

The upshot of my analysis of the reasons why the broad originalists
have resisted the moral reading in favor of trying to develop an intermediate theory is that we should conceive the moral reading as a big
tent that can encompass broad originalist conceptions such as those of
Ackerman, Sunstein, and perhaps even that of Lessig. Broad originalists have employed the argumentative strategy of using Bork and
Scalia, on the one hand, and Dworkin, on the other, as rhetorical foils
or extremes against which to set up their arguments. 83 This strategy
leads to the unfortunate results of caricaturing Dworkin's arguments
and, worse yet, obscuring similarities and common ground between
the moral reading and broad originalism. Again, I would urge the
broad originalists to reconceive their projects as being in support of
the moral reading, not as offering alternatives to it. They can help by
providing firmer grounding than Dworkin has offered for the moral
reading in fit with historical materials. (I do not mean to suggest that
their own moral readings are the same as Dworkin's particular moral
reading.) I shall close by giving three reasons for embracing the moral
reading, conceived as a big tent.
The first reason is hortatory: The moral reading exhorts judges,
elected officials, and citizens to reflect upon and deliberate about our
deepest principles and highest aspirations as a people.' It does not
command them to follow the authority of the past. In a word, it re81. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 18.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 46-79.
83. Compare Ackerman, We the People, supra note 7, at 10-16 (criticizing Dworkin) with Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 Yale IJ. 1419 (1990)
(reviewing and criticizing Bork, supra note 5); compare Sunstein, Legal Reasoning,
supra note 7, at 48-53 (criticizing Dworkin) with Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra
note 23, at 96-110 (criticizing Bork); see also Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 7, at 1260

("From the perspective of the two-step fidelitist, both the originalist [such as Scalia]

and the Dworkinian are infidels.").
84. I do not mean to imply that the moral reading necessarily requires completely
theorized agreements. But see Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 7, at 48-53 (criti-
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jects the authoritarianism of originalism, narrow or broad, as inappropriate and unjustifiable in a constitutional democracy. As Christopher
L. Eisgruber points out, it is ironic if not absurd that originalists would
impose the "dead hand" of the past upon us in the name of popular
sovereignty s5 The moral reading exhorts us to conceive fidelity in
terms of honoring our aspirational principles rather than merely following our historical practices and concrete original understanding,
which no doubt have fallen short of those principles. On this view,
fidelity is not subservient fealty.
The second, related reason is critical: The moral reading encourages, indeed requires, a reflective, critical attitude toward our history
and practices rather than enshrining them. It recognizes that our principles may fit and justify most of our practices or precedents but that
they will criticize some of them for failing to live up to our constitutional commitments to principles such as liberty and equality.8 6 Put
another way, the moral reading does not confuse or conflate our principles and traditions with our history, our aspirational principles with
our historical practices. 87 Again, it recognizes that fidelity to the Constitution requires honoring our aspirational principles, not following
our historical practices and concrete original understanding. That is,
fidelity to the Constitution requires that we disregard or criticize certain aspects of our history and practices in order to be faithful to the
principles embodied in the Constitution. 88
The final reason is justificatory: The moral reading, because it understands that the quest for fidelity in interpreting our imperfect Constitution exhorts us to interpret it so as to make it the best it can be,
offers hope that the Constitution may deserve our fidelity, or at least
may be able to earn it. Ironically, despite their pretensions to a mo-

cizing Dworkin's grand, abstract theorizing and calling instead for "incompletely theorized agreements").
85. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611, 1613-17 (1997).
86. See Fleming, Securing, supra note 34, at 16.
87. See id. at 56-59; Fleming, Constructing,supra note 14, at 268-73.
88. The moral reading frames questions of constitutional interpretation as matters
of principle, to be decided by reflection upon, and deliberation about, basic principles
and constitutional essentials, not mainly as matters of history that have largely been
decided (at least abstractly) for us by our forebears who are long dead and gone. It
underwrites a constitutional discourse that makes recourse to questions of principle
themselves rather than primarily to other people's views on other subjects in other
contexts. And the moral reading makes for a better constitutional citizenry, not to
mention better interpretations of the Constitution. It does not reduce us to pouring
over other people's opinions concerning these questions, nor does it require us to put
our arguments in the mouths of people long dead and gone or to dress up our arguments in their antiquated garb. In a word, it underwrites a deliberative citizenry, not
an authoritarian one.
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nopoly on concern for fidelity, the originalists would enshrine an imperfect Constitution that does not deserve our fidelity.'

89. Originalism, as an ism, has no firm footing in our constitutional culture, and it
has no place there. It is a species of authoritarianism that is antithetical to a free and
equal citizenry. A regime of purportedly dispositive original meanings is, at best, beside the point of constitutional interpretation and, at worst, an authoritarian regime
that is unfit to rule a free and equal people. For a similar view, see Samuel Freeman,
Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, 21 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 3 (1992). And so, I agree with Michael J. Klarman in taking a stand against
fidelity, to the extent that fidelity means what the narrow originalists have asserted
that it must mean. See Michael J. Klarman, Anti-Fidelity (unpublished manuscript on
file with the Fordham Law Review). But unlike Klarman, I reject their conception of
fidelity in favor of a better conception of fidelity as pursuing integrity with the moral
reading.

